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The article aims at understanding the determinants of ministerial 
turnover in presidential systems. There are essentially three key factors that 
govern the propensity for ministerial turnover in a presidential system: 01. 
political ambition - reflected in the individual or collective strategies and 
tactics employed by the party-affiliated actors represented in the cabinet; 02. 
the presence or absence of a governing coalition - which has bearing on the 
degree of ideological distance between the president and such political 
parties as form part of any governing coalition, with consequences for 
ministerial scrutiny; and 03. accountability - a determinant in responding to 
such external pressures as may be brought to bear by public opinion. In order 
to investigate the impacts of these factors, this inquiry seeks to analyze the 
new and dynamic democracy of Brazil. Brazil's presidential system presents 
interesting features that make it an excellent laboratory in which to test 
hypotheses concerning every aspect of ministerial turnover. To this end, this 
paper employs a multivariate methodology, as well as descriptive and 
survival analyses, based on a comprehensive and original database of cabinet 
ministers that draws on three presidencies over five democratically elected 
governments from 1995 to 2014. Among other results, our most original 
finding was that there is an inverse correlation between the degree of 
ministerial politicization (political ambition) and ideological distance from 
the president during political scandals (interaction between the governing 
coalition and accountability) on the one hand, and the length of ministerial 
tenure on the other. 
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his article aims at understanding the determinants of ministerial 
turnover in multiparty presidential systems. Such elements as the 
structure of the party to which the president belongs, the institutional features of 
the electoral and party system, the existence of political and social support groups, 
in addition to regional, ethnic and religious issues, as well as variables related to 
the individual capacities and interests of ministers, together contribute to the 
multivariate nature, dynamism and elevated complexity of ministerial 
appointments and resignations. 
In theory, there are essentially three key factors that govern the propensity 
for ministerial turnover in a presidential system: 01. political ambition - reflected in 
the individual or collective strategies and tactics employed by the party-affiliated 
actors represented in the cabinet; 02. the presence or absence of a governing 
coalition - which has bearing on the degree of ideological distance between the 
president and such political parties as form part of any governing coalition, with 
consequences for ministerial scrutiny; and 03. accountability - a determinant in 
responding to such external pressures as may be brought to bear by public 
opinion in response to unsatisfactory performance or media reporting of a 
corruption scandal. The first two of these three factors relate to principal-agent 
theory and the third to external shock adaptation; together they can explain key 
assumptions in regard to ministerial turnover in multiparty governments.  
In order to investigate the impacts of these factors, this inquiry seeks to 
analyze the new and dynamic democracy of Brazil. Brazil's presidential system 
presents interesting features that make it an excellent laboratory in which to test 
hypotheses concerning every aspect of ministerial turnover. 
First, there are the institutional arrangements of the Brazilian federative 
republic, with its three spheres of government, fragmented party system and 
biannual elections for the Executive and Legislative branches. These foster favorable 
conditions for any minister who may be inclined to resign and run for another 
office in a highly competitive political system. This being the case, political ambition 
may explain individuals or groups of ministers leaving office before a given 
presidential term has ended.  
T 
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The framework of Brazil's political system, so-called 'coalition 
presidentialism', exerts a powerful influence on the selection and potential 
dismissal of cabinet members, given that it involves deliberated calculations in 
a multifaceted environment. The literature on the matter makes it clear that 
the Chief of the Executive (i.e., the president) must take into consideration the 
proportionality of party representation in Congress, as well as the representation of 
social groups and regions (ABRANCHES, 1988; AMORIM NETO, 2006; CODATO and 
FRANZ, 2018; D'ARAUJO and RIBEIRO, 2018; FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1999; 
PALOTTI and  CAVALCANTE, 2018). The scenario becomes even more complex and 
challenging in a multiparty system where there are some thirty parties represented in the 
Legislative branch and the proportion of seats held by the president's party seldom 
reaches 20%. The structure of Brazilian 'coalition presidentialism' is in effect supported 
by a range of parties with different ideological positions. This enables us to analyze 
whether the degree of ideological distance between the president and the parties 
forming the governing coalition entails consequences in terms of the scrutiny to 
which individual ministers are subjected. 
The third factor, accountability, provides a particularly rich seam in the case 
of Brazil, with its compendious history of recurring political scandals, mostly related 
to corruption. The assumption underlying the presumed motive of accountability is 
that presidential decisions to fire ministers occur due to external pressures coming 
from public opinion or within the political system in response to unsatisfactory 
performance or media reporting of corruption scandals. As demonstrated by Araújo, 
Costa and Fittipaldi (2016), the greater a party's ideological divergence vis-à-vis the 
president, the likelier it was to be affected by dismissals in response to media 
reporting of corruption during the first Rousseff administration. Without question, 
coalition management in a government with a single-party cabinet would present 
an entirely different scenario. For one thing, the president's ability to exercise 
scrutiny over ministers would be less constrained, and this would have 
consequences for ministerial turnover.  
In the more than two decades since the reestablishment of democracy in 
Brazil, political science has made significant progress in investigating Executive-
Legislative relations. Nevertheless, little progress has been made on the influence of 
multiparty coalitions on the modus operandi of the Executive branch. 
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Recent advances have been made in understanding the public profiles of 
cabinet ministers and the role they play in presidential decisions on appointments. 
The combination of perceived political experience and administrative competence 
can have a mollifying effect on hostile public opinion (CODATO and FRANZ, 2018; 
D'ARAUJO and RIBEIRO, 2018; PALOTTI and CAVALCANTE, 2018). Relatively 
speaking, however, the reasons for ministerial resignations and dismissals remain 
under-investigated. 
Ministerial churn may be interpreted as a sign that the administrative 
capacity of the government is undergoing renewal or that government leaders  
are sensitive to public opinion, particularly in cases where a minister is removed 
from office due to involvement in a corruption scandal. It may, however, have 
negative implications for policy implementation by reducing the time available to 
the administration. This can lead to projects being interrupted and institutional 
know-how being lost. In the long term, aspiring public servants may feel dissuaded 
from pursuing a career in the public service. These undesirable consequences are 
frequently identified in specialized literature, particularly in the Latin American 
context where turnover is historically high. 
So, under what conditions and for what reasons do presidents replace 
cabinet members? This paper discusses the extent to which ministerial tenure is 
subject to the fortunes of coalitions, influenced by the dilemmas a president 
faces when appointing and monitoring the performance of ministers, and 
liable to external pressures imposed by public opinion. Furthermore, this  study 
seeks to explain why the top non-elected official in a presidential system might 
leave government before the end of a term; in other words, it seeks to explain 
the determinants of ministerial turnover.  
It therefore makes important contributions to the literature on minister 
survival in a democratic context. The main findings of this study are: firstly, the 
importance of political connections in explaining cabinet tenure. The key factor 
here is the political ambition of political actors, itself explained by the divergent 
preferences between actors and the principal. Secondly, although presidents care 
about the accountability of institutions, they respond differently to external shocks 
like political scandals. This is due to the constraints inherent in coalition 
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governments. When confronted with sandals exposed by the media, presidents tend 
to fire ministers from parties whose ideologies diverge most from their own. This 
finding represents an original explanation for minister turnover in coalition 
governments faced with external shocks. Ministerial turnover is in the main 
explicable by reference to the political ambitions of ministers plus the president's 
decision to substitute a cabinet member, based on the factors outlined above. 
Thirdly, this study provides a more extensive and multi-causal overview of Brazilian 
ministerial turnover than previous works in the field of political science. 
In addition to this introduction, this paper is organized in four sections. The 
first discusses the literature on government formation in presidential systems. 
The second presents the authors' hypotheses. The third provides some 
descriptive statistics regarding ministerial turnover in Brazil . The fourth 
section describes the regression models and their results. In the final remarks, the 
hypotheses are discussed and some conclusions are proposed. 
 
The literature on cabinet formation in presidential systems 
Ministers are key actors in the functioning of governments. They are 
political agents empowered to influence the legislative and executive agendas, and 
occupy positions of leadership in their organizations and policy areas. Therefore, 
when a president appoints or substitutes a minister, he or she sends an important 
message to a large number of actors. This has policy, political and symbolic 
implications, with consequences for public policy and governability.  
Research on government formation in presidential systems focuses on 
three areas: coalitional presidentialism, minister recruitment and minister turnover 
(CAMERLO and MARTÍNEZ-GALLARDO, 2018). Coalitional presidentialism relates 
to the politics of forming a legislative coalition in order for the executive to be 
able to govern, and relies primarily on party linkages and institutional 
arrangements as sources of political support (AMORIM NETO, 2006; DRUCKMAN and 
WARWICK, 2005). Minister recruitment relates to ministers' profiles, and seeks to 
investigate recruitment strategies with reference to professional backgrounds and 
political or social linkages in executive formation. Non-party-affiliated ministers are 
the subject of considerable discussion in the literature, given the variety of 
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interpretations of their roles as ministers (ESCOBAR-LEMMON and TAYLOR-
ROBINSON, 2010; GROSSMAN and FRANÇOIS, 2013).  
The third area of presidential government formation research is 
ministerial turnover, which is the object of two distinct analytical approaches: 
principal-agent theory and external shock adaptation (CAMERLO and MARTÍNEZ-
GALLARDO, 2018). Initially, ministerial turnover was regarded as a political tool for 
leveraging alliances among the parties in a coalition government. The resignation of 
a minister may result from a policy difference with the president on the part of the 
minister's party or the minister him/herself; alternatively, resignation may be 
necessitated by the exigencies of the electoral calendar. A president may also realize his 
or her own error in making a specific ministerial appointment, especially in a 
complex political context, such as a multiparty presidential government or 
parliamentary system (DIERMEIER and MERLO, 2000; FISCHER and KAISER, 2008; 
HUBER and MARTÍNEZ-GALLARDO, 2008).  
In parliamentary systems, the tenure of individual ministers (cabinet 
turnover) presents a different dynamic to that of coalition government (length of 
cabinet). Since ministers frequently survive government breakdowns, their tenure 
is weakly associated with cabinet succession (HUBER and MARTINEZ-GALLARDO, 
2008). In Icelandic parliamentarism, the average number of ministers replaced 
every year is half that of the United Kingdom. Possible explanations for this 
discrepancy include a closer alignment of opinion between the prime minister and 
his/her cabinet members in Iceland than in the UK, differences between the modus 
operandi of the Icelandic media and that of their British counterparts, and that fact 
that the Icelandic government model operates with fewer ministries than does its 
Westminster equivalent (KRISTINSSON, 2009). Furthermore, Iceland has a small 
number of ministerial positions available. The presence of dismissed – and 
resentful – ministers in its small parliament could be detrimental to the workings 
of government (DOWDING and DUMONT, 2009).  
Another common feature of parliamentary systems is the principle of 
collective responsibility, which limits the prime minister's freedom to replace 
individual ministers. Decisions on appointments tend to be made collectively, involving 
negotiations with any coalition members and internal party factions (DOWDING and 
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DUMONT, 2009; STRØM, 2000). In Italy, the principle of collective responsibility 
played a decisive role in the workings of the First Republic. The prime minister's 
limited autonomy hindered the holding of individual ministers to account. The 
Second Italian Republic saw a strengthening of the office of the prime minister. This 
occurred due a number of popular personalities occupying the post and using their 
prestige to dismiss or replace ministers without approval from the entire cabinet – 
although the influence of coalition partners tended to limit this discretion 
(VERZICHELLI, 2009). 
In presidential systems, ministerial turnover can reflect conflicts taking 
place in the political arena. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2010) have 
looked at the cases of the United States, Costa Rica, Colombia, Chile and Argentina. 
They found that ministers consistently survived in cabinets where they were 
connected to ministry 'clients'. They also demonstrate that finance ministers are at 
greater risk of leaving their cabinets than other ministers, while 'insider' politicians 
have a lower risk of switching posts than surviving in the cabinet. The president's loyal 
friends are less likely to be dismissed than remain in office, even though they face 
greater risk of being fired. Members of political families are more likely to be dismissed.  
Finally, some scholars argue that State organization at multiple levels of 
government as well as in international arrangements present intervening variables 
vis-à-vis ministerial turnover. In some situations, ministers leave cabinets to occupy 
prestigious positions in international organizations, such as the United Nations 
or the European Union. In other cases, they may leave office to take up posts in lower 
levels of government. Spain and Belgium are examples of countries where mid-level 
ministers may aspire to attractive positions at the local government level, which 
ultimately impacts "the chief of the Executive’s ability to keep even his most talented 
ministers" (DOWDING and DUMONT, 2009, p. 12). 
Those explanations for minister turnover are theoretically related to 
principal-agent theory. An individual minister's tenure is a consequence of poor 
selection or moral hazard problems. Poor selection here refers to the selection of a 
minister by his or her president without thoroughgoing scrutiny. This allows 
the minister to hide his or her true qualifications or policy preferences; this being 
especially pertinent when the minister comes from a party whose ideology 
diverges from the president's. Moral hazard presents the second difficulty. 
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Divergences between principals and agents are derived from their divergent 
preferences. Monitoring therefore becomes difficult, as agents use their 
asymmetric access to information and knowledge to gain benefits in the form 
of political advantages or to ignore the president's or party goals to pursue their 
own. This challenge becomes greater when ministers have multiple principals, such 
as the president and their political party (DIXIT, 1997; GAILMARD, 2009).  
In this paper, principal-agent theory is employed to explain how political 
ambition and government coalitions contribute to ministerial turnover. Since 1988, 
multiparty coalition has been a strategy used by Brazilian presidents to form 
governments. They typically abide by an informal rule, according to which cabinet 
positions are allocated among different political parties. The ability to hire and fire 
ministers is one of the president's main levers of power (PEREIRA, BERTHOLINI and 
RAILE, 2016; RAILE, PEREIRA and POWER, 2011). Principal-agent theory therefore 
provides a suitable mechanism for explaining the Brazilian political system.    
Another possible explanation for minister turnover lies in how the chief of 
the executive responds to external shocks. Replacing a minister may be 
perceived as addressing demands from interest groups or protesters (responsiveness), 
or as an attempt to purge the government of malefactors suspected of corruption 
and/or abuse of power (accountability). However, cabinet reshuffles can lead to 
conflicts within government coalitions; they may also signal high levels of political 
volatility (CAMERLO and MARTÍNEZ-GALLARDO, 2018; CAMERLO and PÉREZ-
LIÑÁN, 2015a; GROSSMAN, 2009; HUBER, 1998; STEIN et al., 2006).  
Reshuffles can also hamper policy implementation by promoting 'short-
termism' (HUBER, 1998; HUBER and MARTÍNEZ-GALLARDO, 2008; MARTÍNEZ-
GALLARDO, 2010). They can act as a source of perverse incentives and impede the 
achievement of policy goals: 
In general, when there is uncertainty as to whether a politician 
will be in office in the next term, politicians do not fully internalize the 
costs associated with their choices for public policies [...] and become 
unable to credibly commit themselves to inter-temporal arrangements. 
In terms of cabinet policy, a certain degree of stability is also needed 
to promote long-term policies and to support the implementation of 
programs and policies in their completeness [...]. In the literature, cabinet 
instability has also been associated with the breakdown of relations of 
accountability between politicians and bureaucrats, with weak 
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accumulation of experience and instability and inconsistent public 
policies (MARTÍNEZ-GALLARDO, 2010, pp. 137-138). 
 
In Germany, individual substitutions tend to be more associated to personal 
enrichment or traffic of influence than to managerial motivations, such as poor 
performance or misconduct (FISCHER and KAISER, 2009). In Portugal, during more 
than thirty years (from 1976 to 2005), less than 10% of replaced ministers had had 
no prior political careers. It can be assumed that the autonomy of prime ministers 
was not constrained by pressures from political parties to replace ministers. Thus 
'independents' became so important to the 'quality' of cabinets that the prime 
minister had to think twice before dismissing them (PINTO and ALMEIDA, 2009, p. 
157). 
Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán (2015a) used a database covering 12 Latin 
American countries over the period 1979 to 2007 to investigate the effects of critical 
events and election calendars on ministerial turnover1. Their findings indicated that 
political clashes – such as protests against ministers and involvement in corruption 
scandals – had an effect on cabinet turnover, but that such effects were tempered by 
electoral projections and the desire to avoid the lame duck effect2. In the 
Argentinean case, Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán (2013b) developed an analysis based 
on three ministerial profiles: politicians, technocrats, and loyal friends (cronies). 
Ministerial stability was linked with the popularity of the president and the 
existence or absence of economic recession. In scenarios of declining presidential 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1The case of Latin America highlights key reasons for ministerial turnover. Focusing on Latin 
America from 1990 to 2003, Martínez-Gallardo (2010) argues that ministerial stability is 
lower than in other regions. Despite some differences between these systems, she demonstrates 
that in most of the region's countries, ministers retain their posts, on average, for approximately 
one third of a presidential term; the exceptions are Chile, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, 
where ministers stay in their posts for over half a presidential term. Another relevant aspect is the 
average number of appointments per ministry. The countries with the lowest average number of 
ministers were Chile, Mexico and Uruguay, with approximately 04 to 06 ministers per ministry. In 
Ecuador, Peru, Colombia and Bolivia there were more than 10 ministers, on average, per portfolio, 
during the period analyzed. Ministerial instability and high turnover rates impede the effective 
implementation of public policies in the region. 
2Presidents are characterized in the literature as lame ducks  when they are likely to be out of 
office within a short timeframe, either because they were not re-elected, chose not to run again or 
were limited by some institutional constraint, such as ineligibility to run in new elections. In these 
situations, presidents are expected to have less political influence over other politicians, such 
as those making up a legislative coalition, and devote themselves to unilateral and sometimes 
controversial or unpopular acts with a view to their long-term legacy (CAMERLO and PÉREZ-
LIÑÁN, 2015a).  
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popularity, a minister's ideological alignment with his or her president had no 
bearing on tenure. Conversely, in cases of rising presidential popularity, more 
aligned ministers are dismissed more frequently than less aligned ones. These 
results show that a cabinet reshuffle can be a proactive tool and is not only used as 
a reactive strategy when faced with external difficulties. 
In this paper, the theory of external shock adaptation corresponds to the 
accountability factor. Brazil has 30 years of interrupted democracy with a free 
press, as well as independent auditing and control agencies and a vigilant public 
(MELO and PEREIRA, 2013). This creates a propitious environment for ministerial 
turnover, especially when ministers are accused by media of unsatisfactory 
performance or involvement in corruption. Figure 01 synthesizes our theoretical 
approach to minister turnover. 
 




Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
 
While coalition formation and its consequences for the relationship 
between executive and legislative powers has been extensively investigated, few 
studies have been devoted to understanding the durability of ministers that test for 
both principal-agent theory (here characterized as both political ambition and 
government coalition) and external shock adaptation (here as accountability). Over 
the following paragraphs, our research hypotheses, grounded in these three main 
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Political ambition 
The literature on ministerial turnover emphasizes the importance of 
attributes related to the career and political trajectory of politicians in the top 
governmental positions as explanatory factors for shorter tenure. (CAMERLO and 
PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, 2013a, 2013b; ESCOBAR-LEMMON and TAYLOR-ROBINSON, 2010). 
Other factors, together, can lead to shorter ministerial tenure, such as the need 
to represent their parties in elections, decisions made by party leaders to break 
with the coalition-forming party, or a lack of connections with experts in the 
field, which can hamper their performance in their portfolios. 
Furthermore, ministers who are members of political parties are subject to 
scrutiny by the chief of the Executive and their own political party's leaders. The 
existence of more than one 'principal' in a delegation relationship, as well as 
institutional and political incentives for greater monitoring of delegated powers are 
relevant factors to explain the pattern of ministerial turnover (HUBER and 
MARTÍNEZ-GALLARDO, 2004; MARTÍNEZ-GALLARDO and SCHLEITER, 2014; 
STRØM, 2000 ). Thus, the increased politicization of ministerial appointments may 
correlate to a lower probability of survival over a presidential term. In the Brazilian 
case, Cavalcante and Palotti (2018) find evidence of this. 
H1: The higher the minister's degree of politicization, the shorter his or her tenure 
in the ministry. 
 
To measure ministers' levels of politicization, we used the Index of 
Ministerial Politicization (IMP)3, an indicator initially developed by Borges and 
Coelho (2015), with some adjustments (PALOTTI and CAVALCANTE, 2018). The 
index includes variables regarding political performance – linkages with political 
parties (affiliation and administrative positions within parties) and experience as 
an elected official – and technical background – level of education, careers in the 
public sector, and managerial experience. These variables were organized using 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
3The database was mainly based on biographies gathered by the Center for Research and 
Documentation of the Contemporary History of Brazil (CPDOC) at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, 
with complementary data gathered by searching the Internet and referring to the historical 
collections of two Brazilian newspapers: Folha de São Paulo and Estadão. The reference was always 
the minister's profile at the time of appointment. 
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publicly available information about each minister. The IMP uses a seven-point scale 
(ranging from 0 to 06), as follows: 
The IPM scale has seven points, from 0 to 06, which add up to the sum of six 
binary variables. 
a. Party affiliation: being affiliated to a political party when appointed 
Minister; (Yes - 01 point); 
b. Elected position: having been elected to any office (in the executive or 
legislative branches, at any level of government) prior to appointment to the 
position of minister; (Yes - 01 point); 
c. Position in party administration: having held a position in the 
administrative structure of the political party (national presidency, state or 
municipal presidency, general secretary, treasury etc., including in its foundation); 
(Yes - 01 point); 
d. Academic training: holding an academic degree at a master's or doctoral 
level; (No - 01 point); 
e) Public or military servants: have previously pursued a career in the 
military or as a public servant; (No - 01 point); 
f) Management experience in the area: having held managerial positions 
directly related to the post subsequently occupied as minister, at the national or 
subnational level; (No - 01 point). 
 The Cronbach's Alpha of the IMP is 0.74. It is therefore above the parameter 
of 0.70, considered the minimum threshold to indicate the existence of 
unidimensionality in the observed factor (HAIR JR. et al., 2014). The lower end 
(values 0 and 01) represents ministers with a predominantly technical profile who 
specialize in policy, while the upper end includes politicians, with strong party ties 
and political backgrounds (values 05 and 06). 
 
Government coalitions 
The existence of broad governmental coalitions directly influences agency 
relations between the president and party leaders and the chief of the Executive and 
ministers (agents), mainly in their selection and the monitoring of their 
performance. Therefore, as in multiparty parliamentarism, in presidential systems, 
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the president negotiates posts and scrutinizes the profiles under consideration for 
appointment.  
The rationale underlying this process is that presidents will attempt to 
examine the profiles so to avoid subsequent problems derived from poor selection. 
However, in a game that involves leaders of political parties who are more 
ideologically distant from the president, there is always the possibility of moral 
hazard associated with ministerial performance. In the expression used by Huber 
and Martínez-Gallardo (2008, p. 172), more distant ministers can cause "public 
policy damage" by their performance, which causes them to be more carefully 
monitored by the chief of the Executive vis-à-vis those ideologically closer to the 
president. 
Considering the features of Brazilian coalition presidentialism, the following 
research hypothesis is tested:  
H2: The greater the ideological distance between the president's party and the party 
of the minister, the shorter their tenure in the ministry. 
 
Accountability 
 Public opinion can directly affect the length of time ministers are in their 
positions. Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán (2015a) explain that critical events – such 
as protests against ministers and corruption scandals – along with the elections 
calendar, especially if there is the possibility of reelection, affect the likelihood of 
ministers leaving the cabinet prematurely. 
In presidential systems with broad multiparty coalitions, like Brazil's, it is 
assumed that presidents will be more likely to dismiss ministers appointed by their 
government partners when they are involved in media-reported scandals. Because 
they face fewer constraints on the formation of their cabinet than chiefs of the 
Executive in parliamentary systems, presidents can more openly punish deviant 
behavior by representatives of allied parties (DOWDING and DUMONT, 2009). They 
choose to tolerate or find other ways out (ministerial substitutions or other possible 
appointments) for ministers from their own party and those without party 
affiliation, who are in general ideologically closer to the president.  
From the beginning of the first Rousseff administration, Araújo, Costa and 
Fittipaldi (2016) identified the president's responsiveness to corruption scandals. 
However, she kept ministers from her own party in cabinet and dismissed those 
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from allied parties. The greater the ideological distance of these parties from the 
president's party, the greater the likelihood of dismissal. Thus, it is assumed that 
Brazilian presidents are sensitive to corruption scandals. Nevertheless, they tend 
to spare their closest allies and punish more ideologically distant partners more 
severely, that is, the presence of government coalitions influences the pattern of 
presidential responsiveness.  
H3: The involvement of a minister in media-reported scandals reduces his/her 
tenure. 
 
There are, however, ministers who are closer and others who are more 
distant from the president and their party. This leads to differential treatment in 
their appointment and, where necessary, their substitution. The hypothesis 
below traces an interactive effect between coalitions and the occurrence of 
scandals. 
H3.1: In cases of involvement in media-reported scandals, more ideologically 
distant ministers tend to stay for less time in their positions than ministers who 
are ideologically closer to the president;  
 
Before testing these hypotheses, the next section will describe the Brazilian 
case, based on the main descriptive numbers concerning ministerial turnover and 
its causes. 
 
Here today, gone tomorrow: ministerial turnover in Brazil 
This section addresses the following questions: do ministers in Brazil remain 
in office across successive governments? Is there variability that needs to be better 
understood? If turnover rates are high, are they symptomatic of conditions within a 
specific administration or do they reflect a broader phenomenon? 
Based on data on all Brazilian presidential appointments, the findings 
discussed by Martínez-Gallardo (2010) were confirmed: there is a significant 
variance in the turnover of ministers both over and between presidential terms. 
The variable used is the length (in days) of the presidential terms of office between 
1995 and 2014. This descriptive estimate was carried out with the use of survival 
analysis to model determinants of the end of a ministerial appointment prior to the 
end of a presidential term. This is the event to be modeled. 
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It is not advisable to extract central tendency measures normally analyzed in 
descriptive statistics, as these include censored data that create biases in the 
estimates4. An alternative is to obtain the median survival time, with the expectation 
that approximately 50% of ministers leave their positions. We used the Kaplan-
Meier estimator to estimate the maximum likelihood of survival. For the period 
studied, the median time was 932 days, which represents approximately 65% of a 
presidential term. 
Figure 02 shows the probability of ministers surviving the event of interest, 
and can be used to estimate the median survival time in a presidential term. There 
are significant variations between terms. Fernando Henrique Cardoso's two 
presidential terms were extreme cases. His first term had a median survival time for 
ministers of 1215 days, indicating that they stayed in office longer than ministers 
under other presidents. His second term, however, had the shortest median time, a 
mere 686 days. 
  




Source: Authors' own elaboration from data collected for Brazil. 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
4Censors occur when the event of interest (in this case, leaving the cabinet or changing ministries 
before the end of the presidential term) did not occur during the observation time. This measure is 
an improvement on the figures presented by Martínez-Gallardo (2010). 
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 During the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores - Workers' Party) governments, 
the second da Silva's administration exhibited low ministerial rotation, with 1104 
days' median survival. In that and the first Rousseff administration, the tenures were 
broadly similar, with ministers remaining in cabinet for a median 919 and 969 days 
respectively. This behavior provides evidence of significant differences in 
presidential style in contexts of varied adversity, given the noticeable differences 
between administrations under the same president5. 
Reasons for leaving cabinet can be grouped into four main possibilities, 
according to the division presented by Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 
(2010). Based on their taxonomy, in the period from 1995 to 2014, as shown in 
Figure 03, the number of ministers who remained in office until the end of their 
presidential terms amounted to 47% of all appointments. This group is 
denominated the 'Survivors'. Figure 03 shows the ministers that were dismissed by 
their presidents, mainly due conflicts or disasters involving public policies, 
personal scandals or corruption allegations. These accounted for 10% of the total 
number and are known as the 'Tragic Ending' cohort. 11% of total appointments 
corresponded to ministers who were moved from one ministry to another, the so-
called 'Migrators'. Lastly, a more heterogeneous set of reasons, ranging from the 
abolition of certain ministries, substantive changes and/or disruptions to 
coalition arrangements, resignation and/or departure from office to run in an 
election accounted for the remaining 30% of cases ('Exit by choice or 
convenience'). Approximately one third of such exits occurred because of election 
or re-election to a public position. Less than 1% were either not identified, or due to 
death or health reasons ('other reasons/unidentified'). 
 One advantage of adopting the classification proposed by Escobar-Lemmon 
and Taylor-Robinson (2010) is the possibility of using the aggregated data, collected 
by the authors for other presidential systems, for comparison with the Brazilian 
case. Table 01 shows that Brazil's rate of ministerial survival throughout a 
presidential term is close to the mean for the countries investigated. Only Costa Rica 
and – to an even greater extent – the United States had lower turnovers than 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
5When applied to each of the five presidential terms, The Wilcoxon test confirms this statement. The 
hypothesis of similarity between the curves is rejected, as chi2 (4) = 15.89, the p = 0.003. 
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Brazil. The figure for Migrators is also close to the average for the other countries, 
although Argentina, Chile and the USA represented extreme counter-examples. The 
Brazilian scenario for the Tragic Ending cohort is similar to those of Chile and the 
United States, but below the average for the other countries. 
 




Source: Authors' own elaboration from data collected for Brazil. 
   
Table 01. Reasons for ministers leaving office - country comparison  
  Brazil Argentina Chile  Colombia Costa Rica  USA Total 
Survivors 47% 41% 44% 45% 50% 74% 50% 
Migrators 11% 19% 18% 14% 10% 3% 13% 
Tragic Ending 11% 28% 12% 21% 21% 8% 17% 
Exit by choice or 
convenience 
31% 12% 26% 20% 19% 15% 20% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Authors' own elaboration from data collected for Brazil, and from data collected by 
Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2010) for the other countries reviewed. 
Obs.: For Brazil, ministers who left cabinet for unidentified or other reasons were added to 
the category 'Out of choice or convenience', following the convention made by Escobar-
Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2010). The periods of government analyzed for each of the 
countries are: Brazil (1995-2014); Argentina (1999-2010); Chile (2000-2010); Colombia 
(1998-2010); Costa Rica (1998-2010); and the USA (1993-2009). 
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Other reasons for exit from office accounted for more than 30% of cases in 
Brazil, which is above the average of the other countries and close to that of 
Chile. Our analysis found that one third of exits were associated with resignation 
to run in an election, and another third due to changes in cabinet relating to 
intra-coalition politics. These findings are similar to those for Chile. Thus, from 
a comparative perspective, Brazil's ministerial turnover trends do not 
constitute especially disruptive characteristics. Brazilian ministerial turnover 
is high in comparison to parliamentary systems6, but similar to those found in other 
presidential governments in Latin America.  
 These data on ministerial turnover must, however, be carefully interpreted. Pinto 
and Almeida (2009, p. 155) warn about the limitations of mapping the reasons for 
ministerial tenure ending. According to them, "the real motives are often hidden from the 
public". For instance, unsatisfactory performance may be presented as a difference of 
opinion. In the Brazilian case, it is reasonable to assume that the low rate of tragic endings 
may be the result of agreements between ministers and presidents to treat them as 
resignations so as to avoid further damage to the reputation of the erstwhile minister 
and/or his party or the government in the court of public opinion. 
This paper's statistical analyses therefore address the set of motivations that led 
ministers to leave office before the end of their presidential term. In this sense we hope to 
avoid subjective or inferred classifications based on limited publicly-available information. 
 
The determinants of ministerial turnover 
Data and methods 
To address these hypotheses, this paper uses a comprehensive and 
original database of cabinet appointments that covers three recent  
presidencies over five different democratically-elected administrations from 
1995 to 20147. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
6Huber and Martínez-Gallardo (2008) have analyzed individual minister rotation determinants in 
parliamentary systems. Of the 19 countries surveyed, only in Ireland does the cabinet end date 
coincide with the date most ministers leave office. For all others, the governments ended before 
their ministers' terms in office, i.e., ministers tended to remain in office from one government to 
the next. 
7The main sources for the database were the biographies held in the Center for Research and 
Documentation of the Contemporary History of Brazil (CPDOC) at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation. 
Complementary sources were the Internet and the historical collections of two Brazilian 
newspapers: Folha de São Paulo and Estadão. 
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Considering the dependent variable description, survival analysis will be 
used as a statistical tool, with minister tenure expressed in days. As Huber and 
Martínez-Gallardo (2008, p. 174) have pointed out, these models "are very useful 
precisely when the dependent variable of interest is the time for the occurrence of a 
terminal event (or a fault) – in this case the exit of a cabinet minister".  
The terminal event (or fault) is therefore a ministerial departure from 
office before the relevant presidential term expires. Migration of a minister 
from one ministry to another will also be considered a terminal event (or fault). The 
objective is to arrive at an understanding of all of the possible reasons for ministerial 
turnover. We have not differentiated between dismissals and resignations, since the 
officially released documents concerning such cases are unreliable as sources. It is 
commonplace, after having been pressured into resignation by president or party, 
for a minister to announce publicly that his or her exit was made for personal 
reasons. Further study of this area, requiring a qualitative approach, presents 
enticing prospects for future research. 
 The longest a minister can stay in office is 1461 days, being the full four years 
of a presidential term. Observations on terms without failures have been 
censored. The same individual can be appointed to more than one role. This allows 
the survival model to be applied without needing to consider the effects of 
covariates on tenure. A similar strategy was applied by González-Bustamante and 
Olivares (2016). 
Unlike in other studies in this area, we did not find any justification for the 
application of fragility8. Our model does not compare countries with each other, as 
did those of Huber and Martínez-Gallardo (2008) and Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-
Robinson (2010), therefore we needed to adjust estimates coming from a cluster, in 
this case from the same country. None of the variables identified in the literature as 
having an impact on ministerial turnover, such as the locus of an appointment, 
media-reported scandals, protests, presidential popularity, or macroeconomic 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
8Fragility was applied to survival analysis models when important variables were not included, 
either due to the data being incomplete or not collectable, or when the survival time could have a 
much greater variability than explained by the model, with super-dispersion. In such cases, fragility 
acts to introduce random effects.  
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variables, were omitted, as González-Bustamante and Olivares (2016) deliberately 
did not consider them9. 
Since minister turnover is, obviously, a multivariate subject, some control 
variables were also included in the statistical model. Among them are socio-
demographics – race, sex, age, and region of the country (in this case, being from São 
Paulo or not) – and party linkage. A binary variable was introduced for ministerial 
appointments to the initial cabinet. Although not central to the research, some 
findings in the literature helped infer the expected behavior for these control 
variables. Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2010) point out that women are 
not replaced more quickly than men. They also find that ministers appointed during 
the initial cabinet tend to spend less time in their positions than others, due to 
problems deriving from poor selection. Berlinski et al. (2009) note that younger 
ministers are more likely than older ministers to exit cabinet positions of their own 
volition, since, for the latter, such a move may coincide with the end of their careers. 
The relevance of the regional dimension is emphasized in the literature (D'ARAUJO 
and RIBEIRO, 2018; DOWDING and DUMONT, 2009). More especially, the distinct 
effect of a minister coming from São Paulo seems interesting, not only because it is 
the country's richest state, but also due to the fact that the parties whose candidates 
occupied the presidency during the period under analysis (the PT and the PSDB 
(Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira – Brazilian Social Democracy Party)) were 
formed in São Paulo state, and the majority of their leaders were of São Paulo 
provenance. The model also includes the area of government, a variable that 
separates ministries according to their policy field: core ministries; public policy 
implementation; political articulation and state functions; and the presidency and 
minor ministers (PALOTTI and CAVALCANTE, 2018). Two other variables are added 
to the model to determine their effect on tenure: being a minister from a traditional 
political family (with relatives in politics); and having a personal relationship with 
the president. The sources of these variables are the authors' database, as explained 
above. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
9To confirm this assumption, the likelihood ratio test after the application of fragility does not reject 
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Finally, variables that measure the president's popularity, unemployment 
and inflation were also employed. As the president is expected to react to these 
indicators, the values for the three months leading up to the dismissal of a minister 
were taken into consideration. Popular presidents tend to have more alternatives to 
exhaust before reshuffling their cabinets, and therefore use this strategy less than 
their unpopular counterparts (MARTINEZ-GALLARDO, 2011)10. However, when 
faced with media-reported scandals, dismissals may be necessary to improve the 
popularity of the chief of the Executive (DOWDING and DUMONT, 2009). It is 
assumed that increased unemployment and inflation rates, both provided by the 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), will correlate to greater 
ministerial turnover. Internal and external shocks that cause economic crises tend 
to be countered by cabinet reshuffles, and can indicate a change in policy direction11. 
Table 02 presents a synthesis of the relationship between variables in the model, 
and the expected effect on ministerial stability. 
 
Table 02. Relationship between variables in the model and the expected effect on 
ministerial stability 
Variables 
Expected effect on ministerial 
stability 
Index of Ministerial Politicization (IMP) (–) 
Party affiliation  
Same party as president (+) 
Allied base (–) 
Ideological difference (–) 
Scandal (–) 
Protest (–) 
Areas of government  
Core ministries (–) 
Public Policy Implementation (+) 
Area of political articulation and State functions (–) 
Presidency and minor ministers (–) 
Family members of politicians (+) 
Friends of the president (+) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
10The data correspond to the percentage of respondents who evaluated the government's 
performance as 'great' and/or 'good'. The data were obtained though research carried out by CNI-
IBOPE and Datafolha, with the use of simple interpolation, measured for the three months 
preceding a ministerial dismissal. Available at 
http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/opiniaopublica/index.shtml# and 
http://www.portaldaindustria.com.br/estatisticas/pesquisa-cniI-ibope-avaliacao-do-governo/. 
11As the data do not obey the risk proportionality assumption, it is not possible to use the Cox model. 
Statistical tests were performed to estimate data distribution, thus the Weibull parametric model 
was adopted. 
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São Paulo (+) 




Source: Authors' own elaboration from data collected for Brazil. 
 
Descriptive analysis 
 Initially some exploratory analyses were performed in order to map the 
effects of independent variables on survival time. From the analyses developed, and 
taking into account survival analysis, we gave due consideration to the IMP, different 
areas of government and involvement in media-reported scandals. Because 
they are categorical, these variables can be graphically visualized in survival 
curves using the Kaplan-Meier estimator. In Figure 04, seven distinct curves relating 
to the IMP are depicted, one for each level, from zero to six. To facilitate 
visualization, the greater the politicization of a ministerial appointment, the darker 
the line. 
It is observed that the dark lines, representing greater politicization, 
begin their terms presenting similar behavior. Over time (specifically, just before 
the 500-day mark), the dark lines reach their nadir – indicating minimum 
probability of survival. This preliminary result shows that the higher the degree 
of politicization, the greater the likelihood of leaving cabinet, especially after 
a certain time in office. The Wilcoxon test points out the existence of   (chi2 
(6) = 13.83; p = 0.0315). 
Figure 05 shows the survival curves when dividing government by 
clusters of political attractiveness12. In these cases, it is observed that the core and 
implementation area lines are always below the other lines, indicating lower 
probability of survival for the ministers in these areas. The area that includes 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
12The division of ministries into four areas of political attractiveness was proposed by Palotti (2017), 
from five variables selected by Mauerberg Jr. (2016): a) total budget; b) discretionary transfers; c) 
networking; d) total of civil servants; and e) patronage. The variables correspond to factors that 
point to a greater or lesser existence of political assets in respect of said ministries. 
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presidential secretaries and minors ministries tends to resemble the political 
articulation and state areas. Over time, however, the latter isolates itself as the area 
with the greatest probability of prolonged ministerial tenure. The Wilcoxon test 
confirms the assumption of statistically significant differences between the curves 
(chi2 (3) = 8.51; p = 0.0366). 
 





Source: Authors' own elaboration from data collected for Brazil. 
  
Next, we can observe the behavior of the survival function when media-
reported scandals occur during a minister's time in office. As can be seen from 
Figure 06, early in the presidential term, ministers with or without 
involvement in scandals tend to remain in cabinet for equal amounts of time, 
and in the short term those involved in scandals tend to survive more than 
those who are not. Thereafter, the curves tend to separate gradually. Ministers 
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Source: Authors' own elaboration from data collected for Brazil. 
 
Figure 06. Survival curves for media-reported scandals (Kaplan-Meier) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration from data collected for Brazil. 
  
At around the 1000-day mark in a presidential term, the curves get 
closer again, although they do not change places, and this can indicate a loss 
of statistical significance for the difference between them. The log-rank test 
presents statistically significant evidence on the distinction between curves, 
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confirming that this effect is probably not isolated from other intervening 
factors, given its lower statistical significance (chi2 (1) = 3.10; p = 0.078). 
From these initial descriptive statistics and the research hypotheses 
previously outlined, a survival analysis will be performed for the dependent 
variable that points to the event which ends a ministerial appointment before the 
end of the presidential term. 
  
Results - survival analysis 
 Table 03 summarizes six different models of survival analysis. The 
observations did not present proportional risks for the application of the Cox model, 
which led to the use of a parametric model. After some statistical tests, the Weibull 
distribution was identified as the most suitable for the analysis of data observed, 
which means that there was variation of risks over time. As this model refers to the 
effect of co-variables on survival time, positive coefficients indicate that the higher 
the covariate value, the greater the probability of survival; negative coefficients, 
in turn, imply that the higher the value of the covariate, the lower the probability of 
survival, that is, keeping a ministerial post in the cabinet. 
The first model indicates the negative effects of the IMP on ministerial tenure, 
with the other variables constant. The more politicized a minister is, the lower the 
probability of surviving, at a level of statistical significance of 1%. It is also verified 
that ideological differences when considered alone do not have statistically 
significant effects on the dismissal of ministers. The variables of media-
reported scandals and protests were not statistically significant either, nor were 
those that indicate the type of party affiliation. 
The second model adds areas of government. Appointments to ministries in 
the areas of political articulation and State functions, when compared with central 
ministries, and maintaining the other variables constant, showed increased 
probability of ministerial survival, with statistical significance at the level of 
5%. These results were initially observed in the descriptive statistics. Moreover, 
ideological differences, political scandals and protests remained without statistical 
significance. 
The addition of the factors of the ministers' political articulation  – 
the existence of ties with clients in the ministries, personal connections with the 
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president and kinship with politicians – did not substantively alter the results. 
The fourth model, which adds socio-demographic variables, did not alter any of the 
observed results. The IMP remained statistically significant at the level of 1%. 
The variables of media-reported scandals, protests and ideological differences 
still did not present statistical significance. 
 
Table 03. Survival analysis for dismissal of a minister before the end of the 
term (coefficients of the Weibull distribution)  
Variables Model 01 Model 02 Model 03 Model 04 Model 05 Model 06 
Index of Ministerial 
Politicization (IMP) 
-0.170 -0.162 -0.183 -01.184 -0.133 -0.137 





0.022 0.069 0.145 0.120 -0.131 -0.164 
(0.207) (0.222) (0.230) (0.235) (0.230) (0.224) 
Allied base 
-0.080 -0.048 -0.037 -0.061 -0.276 -0.416 
(0.277) (0.292) (0.292) (0.297) (0.289) (0.283) 
Ideological difference 
0.015 0.009 0.024 0.038 0.041 0.205 
(0.117) (0.119) (0.117) (0.118) (0.114) (0.127) 
Scandals 
0.037 -0.003 0.021 0.000 -0.050 0.383 
(0.161) (0.166) (0.169) (0.172) (0.170) (0.231)* 
Scandals* Ideological 
difference 
     -0.529 
     (0.175)*** 
Protests 
-0.161 -0.137 -0.137 -0.167 -0.124 -0.099 








0.133 0.139 0.163 0.165 0.170 







0.606 0.582 0.586 0.506 0.492 





0.250 0.284 0.340 0.181 0.201 
(0.190) (0.190) (0.207) (0.204) (0.200) 
Families of politicians  
0.357 0.331 0.257 0.248 
(0.194)* (0.197)* (0.189) (0.185) 
Friends of the president  
-0.027 0.002 0.050 -0.025 
(0.199) (0.209) (0.201) (0.195) 
Ministerial clients 
 
0.113 0.143 0.148 0.196 
(0.183) (0.186) (0.180) (0.175) 
Women 
 -0.065 -0.137 -0.104 
 (0.243) (0.244) (0.237) 
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Afro-Brazilian 
    -0.179 -0.262 -0.312 
    (0.235) (0.229) (0.223) 
Age 
    -0.006 -0.012 -0.012 
    (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)* 
São Paulo 
    -0.011 0.022 0.026 
    (0.173) (0.167) (0.162) 
Initial Cabinet 
     0.124 0.182 
     (0.129) (0.125) 
Popularity 
     0.011 0.011 
     (0.004)** (0.004)*** 
Unemployment 
     -0.134 -0.133 
     (0.060)** (0.058)** 
Inflation 
     0.011 0.027 
     (0.183) (0.179) 
Constant 
7.719 7.522 7.473 7.838 8.756 8.684 
(0.153)*** (0.196)*** (0.195)*** (0.507)*** (0.871)*** (0.847)*** 
ln_p Constant 
0.237 0.265 0.275 0.276 0.322 0.351 
(0.063)*** (0.067)*** (0.067)*** (0.066)*** (0.068)*** (0.068)*** 
p 12.674 13.031 13.162 13.184 13.794 14.199 
N 337 305 305 305 305 305 
Faults 178 156 156 156 156 156 
LR chi2 29.83 34.87 39.01 40.28 60.13 68.53 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: Authors' own elaboration from data collected for Brazil.  
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors between brackets. 
 
The variable of 'political family' became statistically significant in two 
models. This indicates that belonging to traditional political families can 
contribute to increasing the probability of survival in a ministerial post. However, 
adding the variables of the last two models results in the loss of statistical 
significance for this variable. In any case, the statistical significance of 
'political family' was already less robust, at 10%. 
The fifth model adds the additional controls of macroeconomic indicators, 
rates of inflation and unemployment, as well as presidential popularity. All of these 
variables were measured for the third month prior to the dismissal of the minister, 
to provide an idea of the lagged effects of these factors. The variables of the IMP and 
the political articulation and State functions areas remain statistically 
significant. Media-reported scandals, protests and ideological differences remain 
without statistical significance. 
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Presidential popularity has a positive impact on the survival of ministers, 
being statistically significant at the level of 1%. The unemployment rate is also 
statistically relevant, contributing negatively to the probability of 
ministerial survival. Thus, with each increase in presidential popularity, ministers 
are more likely to survive in office; conversely, there is an inverse correlation 
between the unemployment rate and the length of ministerial tenure. 
The sixth and last model observed in Table 03 differs from the others by the 
insertion of an interactive term between ideological difference and media-reported 
scandals. This interaction presents a negative coefficient. In other words, the greater 
the ideological difference between the president and his or her main ministers, as 
measured by the ideological positioning of their respective parties, the lower the 
probability of maintaining their position. Statistical significance for this relationship 
occurred at the level of 1%. The media-reported scandals variable, in turn, is 
positive when ideological distance is equal to zero, with statistical significance 
at the level of 10%. Ministers with no party affiliation or minimal ideological 
distance from the president, as with their own party representatives, are highly 
likely to retain their posts even when faced with media-reported scandals. This 
relationship will be approached in greater detail below, by the graphical analysis of 
marginal effects. Ideological difference in the absence of scandals, was not 
statistically significant (by a very small margin (p = 0.107)). More ideologically 
distant ministers not facing scandal tend towards stability in office. The protests 
variable remained without statistical significance.  
It is observed that, in none of the models,  were gender and race 
variables statistically significant. The initial cabinet also does not present 
itself as a satisfactory explanatory factor to understand individual ministerial  
turnover. Age at nomination becomes statistically significant, pointing to a lower 
probability of staying in cabinet with an increase in the age, with statistical significance 
at the level of 10%. In all models, party affiliation was not statistically significant. 
Withdrawal of party affiliation did not substantially alter the results obtained and 
previously reported. 
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The presence of interaction effects between ideological distance and scandal-
reporting on the ministerial survival can be modeled using recent statistical 
techniques13.  
When applied to survival analysis, the graphical representation corresponds 
to the effect of the 'treatment' or binary variable. The difference between the two 
functions – one with and the other without the presence of the binary variable – is 
calculated against the values of ideological distance, which are then 
represented graphically. Using this method, the variations of the effects of the 
binary variable, given the different ideological distance values, can be 
observed.  
Figure 07 is a graphical representation of the statistically significant 
interaction observed in the sixth model, from the graphical model proposed 
by Royston and Sauerbrei (2009). Keeping the other variables constant, when 
there are media scandals, the greater the ideological distance between 
minister and the president, the lower the chance of survival for the minister 
in his or her current position. 
Thus, at the beginning of the interaction, when the ideological distance is zero 
or close to it, the existence of media-reported scandals has no effect on ministerial 
tenure. The straight line and the confidence interval pass through zero. The effect, 
however, changes with the widening of the ideological difference between the 
president and the minister. After the ideological difference exceeds the value 
01, as this distance increases, coefficients become statistically significant and 
negative. In this sense, in the presence of media scandals, the greater the ideological 
distance in relation to the chief of the Executive, the less likely the survival of 
ministerial appointments. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
13Royston and Sauerbrei (2009) present the solution of multivariate interaction of fractional 
polynomials for cases involving an interaction between a continuous variable and a categorical one, 
as in medical experiments. This method is a more suitable alternative to the traditional approach 
of categorizing the continuous factors for the application of standardized tests of interaction. 
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Figure 07. Effect of ideological differences on the survival of ministers subjected to 
media scandals, following model 06 (Weibull) 
 
Source: Authors' own elaboration from data collected for Brazil. 
Notes: Vertical axis values correspond to the conditioned coefficients of the Weibull 




This paper tested the usual explanations for the exit of ministers before the 
end of a four-year presidential term, using the case of the Brazilian presidential 
system from 1995 to 2014. For this purpose, we considered the variables of profile, 
professional career, political and socio-demographic features, composition of 
specific ministries and the occurrence of external shocks, such as scandals 
and protests covered by the media, as well as macroeconomic and presidential 
popularity indicators. 
The models' results confirm the H1 hypothesis. Consistently, in all models, 
with robust statistical significance, the greater the politicization, the shorter the 
time in cabinet. This finding is consonant with that identified by Cavalcante and Palotti 
(2015), who use two independent indicators to measure the technical and political 
aspects of the ministers, including two other administrations – Collor (1990 to 
1992) and Franco (1992 to 1995). In this paper, the degree of politicization was 
measured using the Index of Ministerial Politicization (IMP).  
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Thus, even after a new measurement, the H1 hypothesis remains valid. 
Individual political ambition and political-partisan projects interfere with the 
ministerial tenure. Under the Brazilian law, ministers wishing to withdraw from 
office must do so at least six months before the next election. In this sense, greater 
involvement in the party and electoral arena are subject to the constraints of the 
powers delegated by political parties, even when the party in question is not the 
president' party (MARTÍNEZ-GALLARDO and SCHLEITER, 2014; WIESEHOMEIER 
and BENOIT, 2009). 
The H2 hypothesis could not initially be confirmed by the regression model. 
Ideological distance points in the opposite direction to the proposed causality: 
ministers more ideologically distant from the president tend to remain in cabinet 
longer. However, this coefficient is not statistically significant, although in the latter 
model, in the presence of interaction with media-reported scandals, it approaches 
the threshold of conventionally acceptable minimum statistical significance.  
 It is possible to infer that greater scrutiny prior to an appointment by the 
president is a condition of ministerial selection. More popular chiefs of the Executive 
have greater autonomy to vet and propose names, and can take lead roles as 
coalition builders. Likewise, unpopularity and recurring conflicts with coalition 
partners may force the president to accept indications that will later prove 
unsatisfactory. Problems derived from poor selection may therefore depend on a 
combination of factors that interfere with the observation of the expected 
relationship between ideological distance and ministerial turnover.  Data 
collected on future administrations should help unravel this relationship.  
The area of the presidency being responsible for political articulation and 
State functions tends to shelter more stable ministers compared to the more 
politically attractive core areas of government. Although not initially considered, it 
is reasonable to suppose that the explanation is close to the logic proposed for the 
H2 hypothesis. Poor selection problems are avoided for this area of government by 
not appointing allied ministers; this results in more scrutiny prior to appointment 
and greater ministerial stability thereafter. Coalition dynamics remain relevant in 
influencing presidential responses to media-reported scandals involving ministers. 
The H3 hypothesis, when observing in isolation the occurrence of media-
reported scandals involving ministers, is not supported by empirical evidence. 
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However, it is supported by observing the derived hypothesis, H3.1. Presidents care 
about public opinion, and are permanently exposed to it. A president's 
accountability in response to media reports, especially of personal and corruption 
scandals, is conditioned by ideological distance from ministers. The strengthening 
of control bodies, in combination with a free press, as in Brazil, result in several 
checks that limit the action of strong presidents (MELO and PEREIRA, 2013). 
Scandals act as alarm mechanisms for presidents, advising them of the existence of 
unwanted deviations coming from ideologically distant auxiliaries.  
Therefore, ministers involved in scandals who are closer to the ideological 
mainstream of a coalition are less likely to be replaced than those who are more 
distant. Although at the macro level presidents react to scandals, it is observed that 
these responses are not equal, and depend on the affinity of the staff involved. These 
findings corroborate the evidence presented by Araújo, Costa, and Fittipaldi (2016) 
for the first two years of the Rousseff government, tested here for the 20-year period 
beginning with the first Cardoso administration. They also confirm that presidents 
apply differential treatment to their most ideologically distant coalition partners, 
which in other studies have been identified as being less likely to participate in 
decision-making processes (GAYLORD and RENNÓ, 2015; SILVA, 2014). 
The results obtained for the variables unemployment rate and presidential 
popularity are consistent with the presidential responsiveness argument, in this 
case due to unsatisfactory performance rather than episodic events such as media 
scandals. Chiefs of the Executive in presidential regimes are directly exposed to 
evaluation via public opinion and appear to use the ministerial reshuffles to produce 
changes that reflect governmental responsiveness. 
In the last model, it is observed that age on taking office was statistically 
significant; the older a minister, the shorter their time in office. This result goes 
against the assumption that younger ministers are more likely to leave the cabinet 
in order to preserve their political careers, while more experienced ministers, upon 
leaving the cabinet, are likely to end their working lives (BERLINSKI et al., 2009). 
Future research should test the extent of this and investigate which factors may 
influence ministerial tenure according to age. It is also worth noting the lack of 
statistical significance relating to gender, race and the initial composition of the 
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cabinet, which indicates that these factors do not interfere with decisions to 
retain, change or dismiss state ministers in Brazil. 
Thus, it is argued that all three sets of explanations initially presented are 
relevant for understanding ministerial turnover. Ministers, by entering in the world 
of politics, create links and situations that constrain their tenure, and are mainly 
driven by political ambition. Government coalitions, in turn, involve multiple 
principals and asymmetrical treatment by presidents of their auxiliaries. Finally, 
media-reported scandals constitute constraints and alarms that mobilize 
presidential attention. Presidents tends, when faced with media reporting of 
scandals, to fire ministers who are ideologically more distant from them. This 
finding represents an original explanation for ministerial turnover. It comes 
primarily from a presidential decision influenced by the factors of multiparty 
coalition government and external shocks.  
In sum, the paper's findings contribute to the advancement of the field of 
study insofar as it explores the main theories of the literature on ministerial 
turnover applied to a new and dynamic democracy. Brazil is most certainly a 
suitable laboratory for this type of analysis, due to its coalition presidentialism, its 
multiparty system and its politicians' constant involvement in scandals, and this 
article sought to analyze ministerial stability with a comprehensive and 
unprecedented review of the local literature on the subject. This study gives an 
extensive and multi-causal answer to minister turnover in multiparty systems as 
Brazil. 
The emphasis of political science studies has been on understanding the 
joint composition of cabinets, rather than the choice or replacement of individual 
ministers. The explanatory factors for a cabinet's initial composition, however, do 
not explain its later conformation. Observing the durability of cabinets allows 
progress on knowledge about the macro functioning of governments, while focusing 
on ministerial tenure helps understand how they function at the micro level. These 
approaches generate implications for the accountability and effectiveness of 
governmental actions. 
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